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I.  Introduction 
Classical writings on federalism point out both the benefits and the costs of 
decentralization (Hayek 1948; Tiebout 1956; Riker 1964; Musgrave 1969; Oates 1972; 
Brennan and Buchanan 1980). Modern literature is divided about their relative 
importance in developing countries. One of the two strands of the literature (see, for 
instance, Weingast 1995; Montinola, Qian, and Weingast 1996; Qian and Weingast 1997; 
Qian and Roland 1998) emphasizes classic arguments for the benefits of decentralization 
and argues that decentralization in developing countries leads to higher accountability 
and, as a result, improvement in efficiency of government and, ultimately, economic 
growth. The papers that belong to the other strand (e.g., Tanzi 1996; Rodden and Rose-
Ackerman 1997; Blanchard and Shleifer 2001; Cai and Treisman 2004 and 2005), in 
contrast, argue that decentralization leads to inferior outcomes and emphasize such costs 
of decentralization as increased capture of the state by vested interests and lower 
internalization of inter-jurisdictional spillovers. Several papers–Bardhan and Mookherjee 
2000; Bordignon, Colombo, and Galmarini 2003; and Redoano 2003–study the welfare 
effect of decentralization allowing for possibility of state capture at both levels of 
government. They explicitly specify conditions under which decentralization leads to 
larger subversion of the state by private interests. 
This paper provides evidence that in the presence of inter-jurisdictional spillovers 
in a federation which is characterized by low accountability of the state and, therefore, 
generally high capture, the welfare effect of capture of local governments depends on 
whether the powerful interest groups have multi-jurisdictional or single-jurisdictional 
interests. Multi-jurisdictional captors internalize inter-jurisdictional externalities of local   3
policies to a larger extent than captors with interests in a single jurisdiction and local 
politicians that are not captured by industrial interests but are driven by political and 
fiscal objectives. In particular, regional restrictions on trade with other regions in the 
regions that are captured by multiregional groups are lower than in the regions that are 
not captured or captured by regional groups. 
In a recent paper, Slinko, Yakovlev, and Zhuravskaya (2005) put together a 
unique data set on preferential treatments to large firms in Russian regional legislation to 
show that 1) regional legislature is subverted by vested interests in many regions; 2) 
political influence generates substantial gains to firms-captors; and 3) the extent of 
capture has an adverse effect on performance of firms with no political connections 
located in the captured regions. That paper analyzed effects of state capture without 
making a distinction among captors with different geographical scope of interests. 
In this paper, we empirically test how the extent of lobbying and its effects 
depends on whether the lobbyist has business in many or just a single region. We use 
preferential treatment data from Slinko, Yakovlev, and Zhuravskaya (2005) to measure 
political power of individual firms and regional-level state capture and relate these 
measures to the data on the regional or multiregional scope of controlling owners of firms 
(i.e., information on whether firms belong to regional or multiregional industrial groups).  
We obtain our main results by comparing performance of firms that do not receive 
preferential treatments (“firms with no political power”) located 1) in regions where most 
preferential treatments are concentrated in hands of firms-members of regional vs. 
multiregional groups (“regions, captured by regional vs. multiregional interests”) and 2)   4
in non-captured regions that have neighbors captured by regional interests vs. 
multiregional interests vs. not captured.   
First, we verify that the extent of political influence on regional authorities does 
not differ between regional and multiregional industrial groups; and, therefore, the 
differences in outcomes of capture by these groups should be attributed to the differences 
in their preferences. Then, we show that capture by multiregional industrial groups is 
significantly more benign towards the neighboring regions compared to capture by 
regional industrial groups or situation of no capture. Particularly, performance of firms in 
non-captured regions is significantly better when the neighboring regions are captured by 
multiregional industrial groups compared to the situation when neighboring regions are 
captured by regional industrial groups or not captured by private industrial interests at all. 
We conclude that multiregional groups to a larger extent internalize externalities of local 
policies on the neighboring regions. At the same time, multiregional groups are found to 
be less benign towards other firms in the regions where they have political influence 
compared to regional captors or non-captured politicians. We also provide anecdotal 
evidence on the nature of spillovers: regional industrial groups often lobby for erecting 
inter-regional trade barriers, while multiregional industrial groups lobby for free trade 
among regions.  
Russia provides an ideal case for studying the effects of local capture by single-
jurisdictional vs. multi-jurisdictional vested interests because, first, during 1996-2000–the 
period under study–Russia was a highly decentralized state with very weak democratic 
traditions and, second, privatization of the early 1990s gave rise to relatively high wealth 
concentration. These two conditions lead to the situation in which private agents, who   5
accumulated control over a large share of resources in one or many regions, could easily 
lobby, bribe and intimidate regional authorities in order to influence legal, political and 
regulatory institutions of their regions (theoretical framework for this argument is 
provided by Grossman and Helpman 1994 and 1995; Glaeser, Scheinkman, and Shleifer 
2003; Sonin 2003 and 2004). 
Our findings also have implications for international trade. Despite all the 
disparities across Russian regions (which have been growing throughout the transition), 
they are much more homogenous compared to a cross section of countries. Thus, we 
consider this exercise to be a laboratory experiment for analysis of the effects of lobbying 
of national governments by multinationals and domestic corporations. Our findings 
support an argument that the latter leads to higher barriers to international trade.  
The paper proceeds as follows. Section II formulates the hypotheses and provides 
anecdotal evidence. Section III presents the data. Section IV verifies that regional and 
multiregional industrial groups, on average, have comparable influence on regional 
authorities. In section V we study spillovers from preferential treatments on performance 
of non-politically connected firms. Section VI concludes. 
II. Hypotheses and anecdotal evidence 
a. Spillover effects 
Our central hypothesis is that in a large federation, such as Russia, capture of 
local governments by powerful industrial interest groups results in vastly different local 
public policies depending on whether these interest groups have regional or multiregional 
scope (i.e., do business in many or just a single region). Particularly, multiregional 
industrial groups when lobby for regional policies internalize inter-jurisdictional   6
spillovers to a larger extent than regional lobbies or local politicians not captured by 
industrial interest groups of any kind. We test this hypothesis by looking at the 
differences in performance of firms located in the regions with neighbors captured by 
regional and multiregional groups and not captured neighbors. 
The main example of a policy that creates inter-regional spillovers on which 
multiregional and regional lobbies have very different preferences is inter-regional trade 
barriers. Such barriers serve interests of regional firms because they are protected from 
competition from producers outside the region but may be against interests of 
multiregional groups because firms-members of these groups located in other regions 
may want to sell in the regional market. Inter-regional trade barriers are a pervasive 
phenomenon for many large developing and transition countries. For example, Young 
(2001) and Poncet (2005) provide many anecdotes as well as systematic evidence of 
inter-provincial barriers in the transitional China. In Russia, numerous colorful stories are 
given by vodka-producing regions that institute barriers to trade in regional alcohol 
markets. For example, in the late 1990s, republic of Udmurtia, Riazan oblast, Astrahan 
oblast, and Yakutia republic passed regional laws that obliged alcohol retailers to have at 
least a certain percent of their sales be from products produced by local alcohol producers 
(e.g., 80% in Yakutia republic); while Vladimir oblast, Saratov oblast, and Penza oblast 
instituted sizable tariffs on vodka produced outside each of these regions.
1 Interregional 
trade barriers arise in developed countries as well; see, for instance, Craig and Sailors 
(1987) on trade restrictions among the US states and a report of the Canadian Chamber of 
Commerce (2004) on inter-provincial trade barriers in Canada. 
                                                 
1 The comprehensive source of regional laws and regulations in Russia is the “Consultant Plus” data base 
(www.consultant.ru/Software/Systems/RegLaw).   7
Case study 1: Uralelektromed and trade restrictions in Sverdlovsk region 
A recent history of trade barriers in Russia’s Sverdlovsk oblast provides a good 
example of how multiregional and regional industrial groups lobby, respectively, for and 
against inter-regional trade barriers. Uralelectromed is the largest cupper refinery in 
Russia and the only in Sverdlovsk oblast (a region in the Urals in Russia) and the fourth 
largest company in the region. Uralelectromed was politically very powerful in 
Sverdlovsk oblast throughout the 1990s. In the spring of 1996, it successfully lobbied for 
introduction of a regional export tariff on products containing precious metals (which are 
the main input for Uralelectromed). This tariff significantly affected the neighboring 
Cheliabinsk oblast, where the Kyshtymsky cupper-electrolytic plant refined cupper 
produced by Sredneuralsky cupper melting plant located in Sverdlovsk oblast. After the 
introduction of the tariff, Uralelectromed became the only profitable refinery of the 
products produced by Sredneuralsky cupper melting plant. At the time, Iskander 
Mahmudov, the controlling owner of Uralelectromed, did not have control over any other 
companies. Later on (in the second half of 1996), Iskander Mahmudov started building 
the vertically-integrated cupper empire with famous holding called Urals Gorno-
Metalurgic company at the head. Once the Mahmudov’s group grew beyond Sverdlovsk 
oblast, the export tariff on products containing precious metals was abolished.
2 
Case study 2: Tatneft and trade restrictions in Tatarstan 
The most politically powerful industrial group in Tatarstan republic (a Russia’s 
region along the Volga) is the oil holding Tatneft with the core company being the fourth 
largest oil company in Russia. Tatneft is a regional holding without assets outside 
Tatarstan. In the 1998, a “lobbing war” started between Tatneft, on the one hand, and 
                                                 
2 For the account of this story, see, for instance, Segodnia (October 4, 1996).   8
other owners of gas stations located in Tatarstan, who produced and refined oil outside 
the region, on the other hand. (The largest of these companies was Luckoil – one of the 
two largest oil holdings in Russia – which owns extraction plants and refineries in many 
Russia’s regions.) In July 1998, Tatneft lobbied for introduction of restrictions on import 
of gasoline to Tatarstan. The government of the region prepared a draft of a decree that 
severely restricted imports of gasoline to Tatarstan. Luckoil responded by forming an 
association of all groups located outside Tatarstan that owned gas stations in the region. 
The association threatened Mintimer Shaimiev (the governor of Tatarstan) with stoping 
refining Tatneft’s oil (Tatneft did not have its own oil refinery at that time.) As a result, 
the decree was not passed. The war was renewed in 2002, when Tatarstan again wanted 
to institute the gasoline import restrictions for oil produced by companies other than 
Tatneft. This time, the association came directly to Sergei Kirienko, the plenipotentiary of 
the Russia’s president in the Russia’s Volga regions, and complained about the illegal 
under the federal law inter-regional trade restrictions. Only the interference of the federal 
government prevented the gasoline import duties to be instituted in Tatarstan. This is 
because Tatneft built its own oil refinery in 2000 and could not have been credibly 
threatened by the association with the interference of the federal government as it was the 
case in 1998.
3 
b. Own region effects 
Another important difference between regional capture by firms that belong to 
regional vs. firms that belong to multiregional groups is that it may have different effect 
on firms with no political power in the captured regions. There are two possible reasons 
                                                 
3 For the account of this war, see, for instance, Russky Telegraph (July 28, 1998) and Vecherniaya Kazan 
(October 4, 2002).   9
for that. First, multiregional and regional captors may have different bargaining power 
vis-à-vis regional authorities. The multiregional groups could be more successful 
lobbyists compared to regional groups because they are better able to move resources 
(i.e., taxable balance-sheet profits) between regions (Khanna and Ghemawat 1998) and, 
thus, they can more credibly threaten regional authorities to withdraw from the region, 
other things held constant. This could be an important bargaining chip because regional 
authorities should be interested in attracting large corporate taxpayers to their region.
4  
Second, it is possible that public goods provided in the captured region will differ 
depending on the regional or multiregional scope of the captor even if large regional 
firms have the same bargaining power vis-à-vis the regional authorities as members of 
multiregional groups. This is because regional lobbies are more likely to value general 
public goods provision in the region. For example, they may have direct ties (i.e., family 
ties) to regional authorities and therefore, have political preferences over regional public 
goods. For example, the wife of Yury Luzhkov, the Moscow mayor–Elena Baturina–
controls a large share of Moscow’s thriving construction business; while the son of 
Murtaza Rahimov, the president of Bashkortostan republic–Ural Rahimov–controls most 
of the oil sector in the republic. The groups owned by Mrs. Baturina and Mr. Rahimov 
get sizable shares of preferential treatments in their regions. Unlike the cases of the 
Moscow mayor or Bashkortostan president, such ties often are not easily observable and 
we are unable to systematically account for them. Thus, they may have an important 
effect on our results.  
                                                 
4 This argument is related to the literature on the presence of internal capital markets in diversified groups 
created to circumvent external capital market imperfections. See, for instance, Hoshi, Kashyap and 
Scharfstein (1991) on evidence for Japanese keiretsu.   10
It is also more likely that owners of the regional firms (unlike owners of 
multiregional firms) are residents of the region where they do business, and thus, have 
direct preference over the regional public goods. There is a sizable body of anecdotal 
evidence that owners of large businesses located in one region live in their regions rather 
than in Moscow, London, or French Riviera–places where most owners of Russia’s big 
business reside–and privately provide a large share of regional public goods.
5 
Both differences in preferences and differences in bargaining power are consistent 
with having capture by multiregional firms being more harmful for other firms in the 
same region. We test whether this prediction is supported by the data by comparing 
performance for firms that have no political power located in the captured regions, when 
the captors are regional and multiregional groups. In addition, we attempt to separate the 
stories of the differences in bargaining power from the differences in preferences. 
III. Data 
The analysis presented here is based on the data from the intersection of the 
following three data sets: 1) the data on preferential treatment of large firms by regional 
legislation constructed and described by Slinko, Yakovlev, and Zhuravskaya (2005); 2) 
the data on controlling owners of firms in 2003 from the World Bank data set “Who owns 
Russia” collected for the Russia Country Economic Memorandum (World Bank, 2004) 
and described by Guriev and Rachinsky (2005); and 3) the data on major ownership 
changes for companies between 1995 and 2003 from the “Labyrinth” data set that 
contains detailed histories of large Russian companies. The detailed description of each 
data set is relegated to the appendix. 
                                                 
5 See, for instance, Julia Latynina’s book “Hunt for Red Deer” (1999).   11
  To measure regional-level state capture and firm-level political power, we use the 
database of regional laws and regulations in Russia that treat preferentially selected large 
firms located in these regions (Slinko, Yakovlev, and Zhuravskaya 2005). The data base 
contains the numbers of preferential treatments (i.e., tax breaks, subsidies, investment 
credits, etc.) for a list of the largest firms in each Russian region. Regional capture each 
year is measured by the concentration (Herfindahl-Hirschman Index) of preferential 
treatments for the five firms with the largest number of preferential treatments. Similarly, 
political power of each firm each year is measured by the share of this firm’s preferential 
treatments in the total number of preferential treatments given to the five firms with the 
largest number of preferential treatments in the region. The focus is on the concentration 
rather than on the number of preferential treatments because the number of preferential 
treatments may reflect the level of paternalism of the regional governments rather than 
state capture.
6 This measure of regional state capture is highly positively correlated with 
Transparency International capture ratings and other indices of administrative corruption 
available for a limited number of Russian regions. 
We merge the preferential treatment data with the data base on ownership 
structure of largest Russian firms from Guriev and Rachinsky (2005). 97% of firms in our 
sample are closely-held. For each of these firms, we identified the ultimate controlling 
owner (traced back from the pyramidal ownership structures) who has above 50% of 
control rights over the firm. We distinguish between the two types of firms according to 
their controlling owners: 1) members of multiregional groups, defined as firms-members 
of industrial groups that include large firms in more than two regions, and 2) closely-held 
                                                 
6 If a regional government gives preferential treatments to all firms, none is treated preferentially (we 
control for the number of preferential treatments in all regressions that look at the effect of state capture).   12
stand-alone firms and members of regional groups, defined as groups that include firms 
in two or fewer regions.
7 The remaining 3 percent of firms have no owner who has above 
50% of control rights; we refer to these firms as having dispersed ownership. 
The data on preferential treatments cover period between 1992 and 2000 while 
ownership data are for 2003. To correct the apparent discrepancy in the time span of the 
data, we used the “Labyrinth” data set. These data allowed us to get information about the 
date of the last major ownership change in the companies from the intersection of the 
ownership data set and the preferential treatments data set before 2003. Unfortunately, 
these data cannot be used to get information about the real owners of firms because most 
of the official records are for the nominal holders of stock and we do not know their real 
identity. We use these data to find out when the ownership structure (recorded in Guriev 
and Rachinsky 2005) emerged.
8 
As a result, we have an unbalanced panel data on 257 joint stock companies in 62 
(out of 89) regions for which we know both the preferential treatment data and the 
ownership structure for at least one year between 1996 and 2000.
9 This sample is an 
intersection of the list of the largest Russian firms (from the ownership data set) and the 
list of the largest industrial firms in each Russian region (from the preferential treatment 
                                                 
7 Two comments are due here. 1) For the rest of the paper we refer to stand-alone closely-held companies 
as “members of regional groups” because we focus on the single-region vs. multiregional dimension of the 
interests of lobbyists and stand-alone companies just as regional groups have a regional scope. 2) We 
characterize firms controlled by a group that is present in two regions as a regional group even though the 
motivation is about single-region groups because many regional groups have some sort of representation in 
the capital city – Moscow – just for the purposes of reducing costs of lobbying. 
8 Guriev and Rachinsky (2005) have information about the real rather than nominal holders of the Russian 
companies. 
9 All firms in our sample are joint stock companies; some of them have significant government ownership 
stakes. All of our results go through if we eliminate the companies with a government ownership stake 
from the sample altogether or explicitly control for it. We do not do that in the baseline specifications 
because there is evidence (e.g., Frye 2003) that in Russia companies with a significant government 
ownership stake de-facto behave as private firms and, particularly, engage in state capture as much as firms 
that are 100% private.    13
data set).
10 Table 1 summarizes the data according to the type of firms’ controlling 
owners: Panel A presents the number of firm-year observations; Panel B reports summary 
statistics for the numbers and shares of preferential treatments. Figure A1 in appendix 
presents industrial composition of the sample. 
To supplement these data, we use firm-level statistical data between 1995 and 
2000 from the Russian Enterprise Registry Longitudinal Dataset (RERLD). It covers the 
basic financial statistics for large and medium-size firms in Russia. 
IV. Are multiregional or regional lobbies more powerful?  
We will test our main hypotheses in the next section which deals with the effects 
of capture by regional and multiregional lobbies on firms without political power. In this 
section, we show that multiregional and regional groups do not differ significantly in the 
likelihood of getting treated preferentially by regional authorities and in benefits they 
derive for themselves from preferential treatment.  
First, we compare the probability to get treated preferentially as well as the shares 
and numbers of preferential treatments received by firms in our sample depending on 
whether they have regional or multiregional owners and find no significant differences. 
This is robust to the choice of specification–OLS with firm-level random effects and time 
fixed effects, OLS between effects, probit, logit, etc.–and to the choice of controls–firm 
size, regional and industry fixed effects, past performance, or nothing at all. The first four 
columns of Table 2 present results of some of these regressions. The shares of 
preferential treatments and the probability to get preferential treatments are remarkably 
                                                 
10 Both of these data sets cover more than 950 biggest firms. Yet, the intersection of the data has a much 
smaller number of firms. The reasons for that are: 1) the biggest firms in the biggest industries (Guriev and 
Rachinsky sample) are located in a few regions only; 2) ownership data set covers services sector, while 
preferential treatments data only cover industry.   14
similar for firms that belong to multiregional and regional groups: about one out of six 
firms gets preferential treatments and the average share of preferential treatments is about 
0.13. 
  Now we turn to investigation of how the benefits of lobbying to politically 
powerful firms depend on their regional or multiregional scope.
11 We regress firm 
performance indicators on firms’ share of preferential treatments (our measure of firms’ 
political power), the type of the firm (regional vs. multiregional), and–in our focus–the 
interaction between the share of preferential treatments and the dummy indicating a 
regional firm. As controls we include the scale of regional state capture measured by the 
average preferential treatment concentration
12, and 3-digit industry dummies. We exclude 
firms that have no controlling owner and firms and years such that firms did not get any 
preferential treatments from the sample to make sure that we have a well-identified 
comparison group. The coefficient at the interaction term shows the difference in the 
effects on performance of an increase in the share of preferential treatments between 
firms-captors that belong to multiregional and regional groups. 
The following performance indicators are considered: log values of productivity 
(sales to employment ratio), profitability (profits to employment ratio)
13, sales, 
employment, and fixed assets controlling for the initial 1995 levels of these variables. 
Each of these performance indicators is de-trended by subtracting industry mean each 
year.  
                                                 
11 Slinko, Yakovlev, and Zhuravskaya (2005) show that on average firms which receive preferential 
treatments by regional authorities exhibit faster growth in profitability, sales, employment, and fixed capital 
compared to similar firms which do not get preferential treatments. 
12 The effect of lobbying on firms may differ in high and low capture environments (Hellman, Jones, and 
Kaufmann, 2004).  
13 Whenever profits are below zero, log profitability is defined as -log(-profitability).   15
  Here and throughout the paper, we run OLS between-effects regressions on 
averages over the period 1996-2000 because ownership data do not vary over time. Since 
only the data on performance and preferential treatments vary over time, their averages 
are taken; while the rest of explanatory variables are constant. We correct standard errors 
for clustering of the error term at the regional level.  
  The results are presented in last five columns of Table 2. Again, we find that there 
is no significant difference between multiregional and regional firms; these two types of 
firms derive the same benefits from preferential treatments by regional authorities. The 
coefficient of the cross-term between preferential treatment share and multiregional firm 
dummy is insignificant and has unrobust sign.  
  One, however, should be careful interpreting these results for two reasons. First, 
we do not have appropriate instruments for the share of preferential treatments which 
likely depends on firm performance. To the extent that this dependence is differential for 
firms-members of multiregional and regional groups, the results are biased. For example, 
it is possible that regional authorities give preferential treatment to regional groups in 
order to bail them out when members of these groups have negative performance shocks; 
while regional authorities do not bail out multiregional groups. This kind of reverse 
causality would bias the coefficient at the cross-term upwards. We, however, do not find 
any evidence of that. We have checked whether preferential treatments correlate with past 
performance and found no correlation for either regional or multiregional firms. The main 
predictor of getting preferential treatments is size while past performance has no effect as 
shown in Table 2.    16
  Second, it is conceivable that benefits from preferential treatment of a particular 
group member can in some way be shared by other members of the group; if this is the 
case, we underestimate the benefits from getting preferential treatments since we look 
only at their recipients. Then, one could argue that this underestimation is larger for 
multiregional groups than for regional groups because benefits from preferential 
treatments are split among larger number of group members. Therefore, the coefficient at 
the cross-term would be biased downwards. Unfortunately, we cannot measure aggregate 
benefits of preferential treatments for the entire groups because many members of the 
groups that we study are in financial and services sectors (while we have data only for 
industrial firms). Since information on the number of firms in the groups is available, we 
verified that results are robust to controlling for the number of firms in the group: benefits 
from preferential treatments to firms in the same-size multiregional and regional groups 
are the same.
14  
  Thus, we conclude that there is no difference in the extent of political influence of 
regional and multiregional industrial groups on regional authorities and, therefore, we 
attribute differences in the effects of capture by these lobbyists to differences in their 
preferences.  
V. Effects of capture on performance of firms that have no political influence 
To test our hypotheses, we need to define what it means for a region to be 
captured by a multiregional or a regional interest group. We define a region in a 
particular year to be captured by a particular type of interest groups if 1) the region is 
                                                 
14 Moreover, if multiregional and regional lobbies had different bargaining power vis-à-vis the regional 
authorities, we would have observed not only that the benefits of preferential treatments differ between 
these two types of lobbies, but also the incidence of preferential treatments to them. Yet, as we have shown 
above, there is no difference in the likelihood or shares of preferential treatments between members of 
regional and multiregional groups.   17
captured (i.e., preferential treatments are not zero and are not uniformly distributed across 
firms) and 2) at least 50% of all preferential treatments go to firms controlled by groups 
of this particular type.
15 A region in a particular year is said to be not captured if there 
were no preferential treatments that year in that region. If we do not know the type of 
firms-recipients of the majority of preferential treatments or preferential treatments are 
uniformly distributed across firms (irrespective of their type), we deem this region-year 
observation missing. Table A1 in the appendix presents the lists of regions by type of 
their captor and year. 
We split the task of this section in two. First, we estimate the differences in the 
effects of capture by regional and multiregional firms on firms with no political 
connections in the captured regions, and then, the differences in the effects of capture by 
types of controlling owner on firms with no political power in the neighboring regions.  
V.1. Effects in own jurisdiction 
To compare the effect of lobbying by multiregional and regional groups on firms 
with no political connections that are located in the captured regions, we regress 
performance of these firms on the dummy that indicates the type of the captor. We use 
the following OLS between effects specification:  
1 0 α α + = f y (Dummy “the captor of this region is a member of a regional group”)f 
2 α + (Average regional preferential treatment concentration) f 
3 α + (Average regional number of preferential treatments) f 
4 α + (Initial y) f  5 α + (Dummy “disperse ownership”) f  
+ 3-digit industry fixed effects f  f ε +        ( 3 )  
                                                 
15 Note that it always is the case in the data that if a region is captured by a multiregional (regional) interest 
group according to our definition, the firm-recipient of the largest share of preferential treatments in this 
region belongs to the group of this type.   18
where y stands for the same performance indicators as in the previous section. As above, 
we de-trend firm performance indicators (y) by subtracting industry trend. The main 
explanatory variable is the dummy for the type of capture in the region: the dummy 
equals one if the region where firm is located is captured by a regional group). We 
control for industry-specific effects, disperse ownership dummy, and the initial level of 
the dependent variable. Following the methodology of Slinko, Yakovlev, and 
Zhuravskaya (2005), we control for the level of capture in the region with preferential 
treatment concentration and for the paternalism of the regional government with the 
number of preferential treatments. Standard errors are corrected for clustering of the error 
term at the regional-level.  
We restrict the sample to firms that do not receive any preferential treatments 
(firms with no political power). In addition, we run this regression on the subsample of 
regions and years such that there is some inequality in preferential treatments present in 
the region. This ensures that we have only captured regions in the sample, and therefore, 
our control group is well defined: we compare effects of capture by multiregional and 
regional firms rather than comparing the effects of capture by a certain type of owner to 
the situation of no capture.  
In addition to using the sample for which we have detailed ownership data 
(described in section III), we run the same regressions on a much larger sample of all 
large and medium size firms (from RERLD) located in the captured regions that have the 
same 3-digit industry as the captor firms. Slinko, Yakovlev, and Zhuravskaya (2005) 
argued that these firms most likely have no political influence because only the largest 
firms receive preferential treatments and the largest first are covered by the preferential   19
treatments data. (As above, we exclude recipients of preferential treatments according to 
preferential treatments data set.) Since some of these firms are 100% state-owned, we 
control for state enterprise dummy in these regressions. 
Table 3 reports regression results. We find that lobbing by regional groups is 
significantly less predatory towards the other firms in the same region compared to 
lobbying by the multiregional groups. The results are consistent across performance 
measures and between the two samples. Productivity, sales, fixed assets and employment 
growth are significantly slower in firms with no political connections when a region is 
captured by firms that belong to multiregional groups.
16 For a given level of regional 
concentration and numbers of preferential treatments, growth in productivity, sales and 
fixed capital in firms with no political connections is 25, 46, and 46 percent higher 
(respectively) when majority of preferential treatments go to regional groups compared to 
when they go to multiregional groups.
17 
This result is consistent with the two alternative stories (discussed in the 
hypothesis section). The first story is the difference in preferences: Regional private firms 
may have stronger ties to the regional authorities who care about overall regional 
performance for political reasons or are themselves interested in overall regional 
prosperity, e.g., local public goods. The second story is the difference in bargaining 
power: Multiregional firms could have higher bargaining power vis-à-vis the regional 
authorities compared to the regional firms. The bargaining power explanation, however, 
is inconsistent with results shown in the previous section. Therefore, we conclude that the 
                                                 
16 Slinko, Yakovlev, and Zhuravskaya (2005) show that firms with no political power perform significantly 
worse in captured regions compared to non-captured regions. We verified that this is true for regions 
captured by multiregional and by regional groups. 
17 Henceforth, we report the magnitude of the effects based on the estimates from the larger sample.   20
regional private lobbies have preferences for better public goods provision in the region 
where they operate compared to multiregional lobbies. This, however, can be explained 
by the possible political objectives from their (unobserved) ties to regional authorities. 
V.2. Inter-regional spillovers 
Finally, to estimate the difference in effect of lobbying by multiregional vs. 
regional interest groups on the inter-jurisdictional spillovers, we regress performance of 
firms in the non-captured regions on the dummy that equals one if at least one of the 
neighboring regions is captured by a multiregional group. We look at the capture in the 
neighboring regions because we assume that spillovers are higher between neighbors than 
between regions that are far away from each other. For example, if we consider inter-
regional trade barriers to be the source of spillovers, we rely on gravity model of trade 
(Linnemann 1966) to motivate looking at the immediate geographical neighbors. 
Let us summarize our main variable of interest here – the dummy for presence of 
a neighbor captured by a multiregional group. Two out of five non-captured regions had 
at least one neighbor captured by a multiregional group, while only one out of five has a 
neighbor captured by a regional group. (The number of regions that were non-captured at 
least once during the time period is 51; out of them, 25 had no neighbors captured by 
multiregional group throughout the whole period; 12 always had them, and 11 had them 
for at least half of the time period.) There are only 6 observations (region-year 
combinations) such that non-captured regions had both neighbors captured by regional 
and by multiregional groups. Figure 1 shows the geographical distribution of regions by 
the type of capture in 2000. It is worth noting that the type of regional capture is a very 
persistent variable as shown in Table A1.   21
The motivation for looking at the dummy for presence of a neighbor captured by a 
multiregional group rather than, say, the share of “multiregionally-captured” neighbors is 
as follows. If one considers inter-regional trade barriers as a source of spillovers, an 
impact of having one border with an open-to-trade region compared to being absolutely 
landlocked (i.e., having no open-to-trade borders) should be much bigger than the impact 
of having an additional open-to-trade border compared to the situation when the region 
already has a few. Nonetheless, we test robustness of our results to using the share of 
“multiregionally-captured” neighbors instead of the dummy for their presence. 
We use the following OLS between effects specification:  
1 0 α α + = f y (Dummy “at least one neighboring region is captured by multiregional 
 group”)f 
2 α + (Dummy “none of the neighboring regions is captured”) f  
3 α + (Average preferential treatment concentration in neighboring regions) f  
4 α + (Average number of preferential treatments in neighboring regions) f 
5 α + (Dummy “multiregional groups - captors of the neighboring 
 regions own firms in this region”) f 
6 α + (Initial y) f  7 α + (Dummy “disperse ownership”) f  
+ 3-digit industry fixed effects f  f ε +        ( 4 )  
 
We control for the average capture and paternalism of the neighboring regions 
with the average neighboring preferential treatment concentration and the average 
neighboring number of preferential treatments. To have a well-defined control group we 
include a dummy which equals one if none of the neighboring regions is captured as one 
of the regressors. Thus, coefficient α1 estimates the difference between spillovers from 
regionally and multi-regionally captured regions; while α2 estimates the difference 
between spillovers from regionally captured and non-captured regions.    22
As discussed above, firms-members of the multiregional groups, other members 
of which receive preferential treatment in the neighboring regions, may enjoy benefits of 
these preferential treatments. In order to rule this out as a possible driving force of the 
results, we exclude them from the sample. In addition, we control for a dummy that 
equals one if the region has firms-members of multiregional groups that capture 
neighboring regions. This is an important control because preferential treatment given to 
other members of the group may not only have a direct effect on other members of the 
group but also hurt their competitors. This is similar to the effect of capture on non-
captors in the same region (shown in section V.1.). It is important to note that this 
estimation strategy is valid when it is politically infeasible for regions to restrict trade 
selectively with some specific regions and not with others. If that were possible, multi-
regional captors would have lobbied for trade restrictions with regions where they do not 
operate. Yet, we have not found any evidence of selective trade barriers. 
We restrict ourselves to the subsample of regions-years such that preferential 
treatments are not given out at all to any firms to make sure that we look at non-captured 
regions only. As usual, standard errors are corrected for clustering of the error term at the 
regional-level. 
As in the previous section, in addition to our primary sample, we run the same 
regressions using data on all large and medium-size companies in Russia (RERLD). This 
allows us not only to increase the number of firms in the sample but also to significantly 
increase the number of regions: we include firms in all the regions that have no capture 
according to preferential treatments data set, and restrict our attention to firms in the same 
industries as captors in our sample.    23
The results are presented in Table 4. We find that spillovers from regions captured 
by multiregional groups are significantly more benign to firms in the neighboring regions 
compared to spillovers from regions captured by regional groups and to spillovers from 
non-captured regions. Again, the results are consistent across different performance 
measures and between the two samples. The coefficients of the dummy for presence of a 
neighbor captured by multiregional groups are positive and significant almost 
everywhere. These coefficients estimate the difference in spillovers from neighbors with 
at least one neighbor captured by multiregional groups and neighbors such that at least 
one of them is captured by a regional group and none are captured by multiregional 
groups. The results also allow us to compare spillovers from “multiregionally-captured” 
regions and not captured regions. The difference between coefficients of the dummy for 
mulitregionally-captured neighbor and dummy for no captured neighbors estimates this 
difference; we report its point estimates and standard errors in the last row of Table 4. It 
is always positive and in many cases significant. Thus, spillovers from regions captured 
by multiregional groups are more benign than spillovers both from regions captured by 
regional groups and from not captured regions. The latter result is consistent with 
evidence on China presented by Young (2000) and Poncet (2005). These papers argue 
that Chinese province-level politicians erect inter-province trade barriers to protect their 
own rents (as opposed to rents of industrial lobbies). Particularly, Poncet shows that 
regional protectionism is partly explained by political incentives of provincial 
governments to avoid social unrest from closing down inefficient local firms (a la 
Shleifer and Vishny 1994) and to maximize tax collection.   24
The economic significance of these results is as follows: Growth in productivity, 
profitability, sales, fixed capital, and employment in firms that are located in non-
captured regions is 8, 25, 10, 5, and 2 percent higher (respectively) when at least one 
neighboring region is captured by multiregional groups compared to the situation when 
some neighboring regions are captured by regional groups and there is no neighboring 
region captured by multiregional groups. In addition, growth in productivity and sales of 
firms in non-captured regions is 5 and 7 percent higher (respectively) when at least one of 
the neighboring regions is captured by multiregional groups compared to having all 
neighboring regions not captured.
18 
VII. Conclusions 
Our main finding is that in a federation, lobbies of local governments whose 
business interests span over many regions and lobbies whose interests concentrate in a 
single region have different preferences concerning inter-jurisdictional spillovers and 
public goods provision in their jurisdictions. Multi-jurisdictional lobbies internalize 
spillovers between jurisdictions to a larger extent than both the single-jurisdictional 
lobbies and politicians not influenced by industrial lobbies. At the same time, multi-
jurisdictional lobbies do not value public goods and overall prosperity in the jurisdictions 
where they operate as much as regional lobbyists and not captured politicians. 
The welfare implications of our analysis depend on the size of each of these 
effects, of course. The most interesting and the least trivial, however, is the “spillover 
                                                 
18 We checked robustness of these results to using a share of “multiregionally-captured” neighbors instead 
of the dummy for the presence of at least one such region. The results are generally robust; although 
significance drops in a few places. In addition, we check robustness of all results in the paper to using 
random effects rather than between effects model. The results are robust. The advantage of random effects 
specification is that we can explicitly control for time variation with year dummies, but the disadvantage of 
using random effects is that, in quite a few cases, the Hausman (1978) specification test indicates that 
random effects model yields inconsistent estimates. Thus, as a baseline, we report results from between 
effects model.     25
effect.”  Holding other things constant, the larger the size of potential inter-jurisdictional 
externalities of local policies, the more beneficial the role of multi-jurisdictional lobbies 
for overall welfare. For example, if local governments have means of restricting trade 
between regions (which, for instance, has been the case in Russia and China), politically 
powerful multi-jurisdictional companies serve as a unifying force that prevents market 
fragmentation. Having multi-jurisdictional lobbies capture the local policies can be 
welfare improving even compared to having local politicians not captured by industrial 
interests since accountable local politicians may generate large inter-regional externalities 
with objectives of protecting local employment and fiscal revenue. 
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Table 1. Summary of the data 
Panel A. Distribution of observations (firms*years) by type and year 
   1996  1997  1998  1999  2000  96-00 
Controlled by a multiregional group  78  95  102  117  170  562 
Controlled by a regional group  65  67  68  70  69  339 
No control - disperse ownership  8  8  9  9  9  43 
Total number of observations  151  170  179  196  248  944 
Total number of regions  59  60  61  61  62  62 
Total number of firms  151  170  179  196  248  257 
 
Panel B. Summary statistics: firm type and preferential treatments 
  
Share of preferential 
treatments 
Number of preferential 
treatments per firm 
  
# of 
obs. Mean  SD  Min Max Mean SD  Min  Max
Controlled by a multiregional group  562  0.133 0.196 0 1 0.214 0.528  0  3
Controlled by a regional group  339  0.137 0.220 0 1 0.236 0.584  0  4
No control - disperse ownership  43  0.147 0.172 0 1 0.145 0.438  0  2
Total  944  0.134 0.202 0 1 0.215 0.540  0  4
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Table 2. Regional and multiregional groups derive similar benefits from their political power 












































Dummy-multiregional group  -0.003  -0.015  0.022  0.012  -0.388  -0.208  -0.157  -0.055  0.28 
   [0.020]  [0.039]  [0.028]  [0.041]  [0.146]** [0.354]  [0.157]  [0.238]  [0.136]** 
PT share * Dummy- multiregional group          -0.326  1.468  -0.176  1.031  0.076 
(difference in effects for multiregional 
and regional groups) 
        [0.526]  [1.573]  [0.670]  [0.837]  [0.457] 
Initial employment level  0.021  0.042               
  [0.008]*** [0.021]**              
Past employment level      0.025  0.039           
      [0.010]** [0.019]**           
Past profitability growth      0.005  0.002           
      [0.004]  [0.006]           
Preferential treatments share          0.556  0.834  1.054  1.023  0.348 
           [0.422]  [1.210]  [0.446]** [0.679]  [0.457] 
Concentration of preferential treatments          0.139  1.622  0.499  0.254  0.247 
           [0.252]  [0.720]** [0.427]  [0.489]  [0.291] 
Initial level of dependent variable          0.592  0.24  0.683  0.643  0.831 
          [0.103]*** [0.082]*** [0.061]*** [0.055]*** [0.049]*** 
Industry dummies (3-digit)  Yes    Yes    Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Year dummies    Yes  Yes  Yes           
Constant  -0.04    -0.105    2.302  7.998  4.076  6.393  1.007 
   [0.071]    [0.091]    [0.694]*** [1.210]*** [0.902]*** [0.805]*** [0.468]** 
Observations  240  878  686  686  193  191  194  192  194 
R-squared  0.11    0.06    0.59  0.41  0.71  0.81  0.86 
Note: Robust standard errors clustered at the regional level are in brackets; * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. 
All regressions exclude firms with no controlling owner. In the second set of regressions, across-firms average share of preferential treatments is 
subtracted from the firm’s preferential treatment share before taking the cross-term to make interpretation of the coefficient at the multiregional 
group dummy easier. It is equal to the full direct effect of multiregional group dummy on performance evaluated at the mean value of preferential 
treatment share. Interpretation of other coefficients is unchanged.   30
Table 3. Effect of regional capture on performance of firms with no political influence located in the same region by type of the captor 
 



















0.298  0.549  0.398  0.587  0.199  0.245  0.113  0.463  0.46  0.05  Dummy - captured by 
regional groups  [0.156]*  [0.444]  [0.195]** [0.167]*** [0.097]**  [0.040]*** [0.697]  [0.151]*** [0.086]*** [0.071] 
0.58  -0.48  -0.086  -1.033  -0.691  -0.065  3.3  -0.986  -0.439  -0.122  Dummy - captured by 
firms with disperse 
ownership 
[0.463]  [0.774]  [0.828]  [0.683]  [0.328]**  [0.136]  [1.672]*  [0.358]** [0.078]*** [0.134] 
1.311  -0.249  0.586  -1.087  -0.44  0.017  8.205  -0.68  -0.072  0.101  Concentration of PTs 
in the region  [0.525]** [1.268]  [0.768]  [0.585]*  [0.340]  [0.227]  [3.588]** [0.700]  [0.258]  [0.195] 
0.209  -0.319  0.122  -0.233  -0.13  -0.023  0.081  -0.279  -0.201  0.023  Number of PTs in the 
region  [0.121]*  [0.228]  [0.141]  [0.127]*  [0.075]*  [0.053]  [0.758]  [0.176]  [0.051]*** [0.038] 
0.001  0.865  -0.515  -0.429  -0.318            Dummy - disperse 
ownership  [0.205]  [1.430]  [0.358]  [0.332]  [0.208]           
0.848  0.155  0.753  0.764  0.812  0.859  0.606  0.978  0.857  0.993  Initial level of 
dependent variable  [0.159]*** [0.098]  [0.109]*** [0.093]*** [0.055]***  [0.027]*** [0.044]*** [0.015]*** [0.030]*** [0.013]***
Dummy – state firm            0.021  -0.738  0.018  -0.035  0.033 
            [0.052]  [0.370]*  [0.083]  [0.063]  [0.057] 
Industry dummies  
(3-digit) 
Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Constant  -6.228  0.798  2.215  -0.454  -4.566  -4.91  -9.319  -11.167  -5.527  -6.755 
   [1.199]*** [1.498]  [1.845]  [1.560]  [0.701]***  [0.337]*** [4.524]*  [0.820]*** [0.376]*** [0.228]***
Observations  102  104  105  101  102  500  463  580  497  502 
R-squared  0.68  0.43  0.67  0.82  0.85  0.81  0.66  0.91  0.89  0.96 
Note: Robust standard errors clustered at the regional level are in brackets; * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
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Table 4. The effect of capture on performance of firms located in neighboring non-captured regions by type of the captor 
 



















0.621  2.831  0.104  0.426  0.076  0.078  0.245  0.101  0.052  0.022  Dummy – one of the 
neighb. regions is captured 
by a multiregional group 
[0.187]*** [0.717]*** [0.162]  [0.236]*  [0.114]  [0.031]**  [0.112]**  [0.038]**  [0.028]*  [0.008]** 
0.399  0.958  -0.115  -0.363  -0.313  0.03  0.113  0.035  0.042  0.017  Dummy – all neighb. 
regions are not captured  [0.159]**  [0.449]**  [0.212]  [0.237]  [0.129]**  [0.034]  [0.119]  [0.034]  [0.031]  [0.008]** 
0.047  -0.599  -0.826  -1.031  -0.523  -0.01  -0.141  0.073  0.059  0.024  Average concentration of 
PTs in the neighb. regions  [0.607]  [1.950]  [0.748]  [0.643]  [0.462]  [0.083]  [0.360]  [0.129]  [0.063]  [0.018] 
0.051  -0.13  -0.047  -0.183  -0.088  0.001  -0.008  0.005  0.008  -0.001  Average number of PTs 
in the neighb. Regions  [0.087]  [0.181]  [0.085]  [0.084]**  [0.081]  [0.010]  [0.043]  [0.012]  [0.008]  [0.003] 
-0.776  1.386  -0.553  -0.166  -0.399            Dummy – disperse 
ownership  [0.448]*  [0.516]**  [0.645]  [0.257]  [0.322]           
-0.309  -2.225  0.042  -0.824  0.072  -0.076  0.059  -0.15  -0.073  -0.009  Dummy – member of 
group-captor is present in 
the region 
[0.227]  [0.822]**  [0.284]  [0.346]**  [0.247]  [0.038]*  [0.082]  [0.037]*** [0.040]*  [0.011] 
0.572  0.084  0.799  0.645  0.834  -0.017  -0.104  -0.014  -0.007  -0.001  Initial level of dependent 
variable  [0.145]*** [0.085]  [0.091]*** [0.055]*** [0.065]***  [0.007]**  [0.032]*** [0.005]*** [0.005]  [0.001] 
Dummy – state firm            0.016  -0.1  0.016  -0.037  0.008 
            [0.020]  [0.075]  [0.020]  [0.015]**  [0.006] 
Industry dummies (3-
digit) 
Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Constant  -3.56  -0.349  3.329  1.299  -4.585  0.024  -0.035  -0.025  -0.003  -0.016 
  [0.904]*** [1.463]  [1.400]**  [0.945]  [0.700]***  [0.070]  [0.276]  [0.105]  [0.061]  [0.018] 
Observations  118  119  121  117  121  1547  1436  1661  1511  1635 
R-squared  0.66  0.62  0.78  0.8  0.87  0.13  0.26  0.12  0.18  0.07 
0.222  1.873  0.22  0.789  0.389  0.047  0.131  0.066  0.01  0.005  Difference b/w neighb. -
captured by multireg. gr. 
and non-captured at all 
[0.196]  [0.772]**  [0.233]  [0.336]**  [0.170]**  [0.028]*  [0.081]  [0.035]*  [0.019]  [0.008] 
Note: Robust standard errors clustered at the regional level are in brackets; * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
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Figure 1. Russian regions by the type of capture in 2000. 
 




The preferential treatments data set from Slinko, Yakovlev, and Zhuravskaya 2005 
The database contains all preferential treatments between 1992 and 2000 given by 
regional legislators and regulators to 978 firms in Russia. Firms were chosen on the basis of 
being among the five largest firms at least once during 1992 – 2000 in any Russian region. 
An enterprise was said to be treated preferentially if it received any of the following 
benefits: tax breaks, investment credits, subsidies, subsidized loans and loans with a 
regional budget guarantee, official delays in tax payments, subsidized licensing, free grants 
of state property, or a special “open economic zone” status for their territory. The number 
of regional laws and regulations that grant distinct preferential treatments to each firm in 
the sample each year is collected. The source of the information about preferential 
treatments is the comprehensive database of Russia’s regional legislation “Consultant Plus” 
(www.consultant.ru/Software/Systems/RegLaw).  
It is worth noting that preferential treatment data have a couple of significant 
drawbacks: First, the importance of different preferential treatments cannot by quantified 
(i.e., we cannot compare the benefits firms get from a tax break or a transfer of a large 
piece of land to them); thus, the data are just a count of the number of legislative acts with 
distinct preferential treatments. Second, authors identify preferential treatment only when 
texts of the law contain direct reference to a firm. Despite these drawbacks, the measures of 
regional-level capture and firms’ political influence survive a number of reality checks.  
Looking at the five largest recipients of preferential treatments per region in any 
particular year seems to be sufficient to construct reliable measures of political power for 
firms and state capture for regions because for the vast majority of years and regions (well 
above 90%), fewer than six firms receive preferential treatments. For a more detailed 
description of the data see Slinko, Yakovlev and Zhuravskaya (2005). 
The ownership data set from Guriev and Rachinsky 2005 
Ownership data that we start with are described by Guriev and Rachivsky (2005) 
(G&R) as follows: “The [] project identified the structure of control for about 1,700 large 
firms in 45 sectors of Russian economy…[] The sectors were selected based on their size in 
order for the survey to cover as large a portion of the economy as possible…[] The next 
stage was to target the largest establishments and firms within the sectors. In industry, for 
example, our firms represented 35 percent of employment and 85 percent of sales of the 
selected sectors. Finally, economists and business journalists interviewed investment banks, 
consultancies, business advisors, information agencies and other institutions. They 
identified the main controlling owners of each firm and the portion of the firm they owned 
and also any subsidiaries owned by the firms. This in turn generated new sets of firms to be 
investigated – subsidiaries and corporate owners. A chain would stop downward when a 
firm owned no subsidiaries and would stop upward when an “ultimate owner” or 
“controlling party” was identified. The data were checked and supplemented with publicly 
accessible information.” (p. 132).  
The Labyrinth data set 
The data set contains informal but very detailed account of the histories of most 
Russian companies. The histories include records of all the major ownership changes. The 
data set can be found at http://www.panorama.ru/info/labir.html.   34
 
 
Table A1. Types of regional capture 
Region  1996  1997  1998  1999  2000  Region  1996  1997  1998  1999  2000 
Omsk oblast  MR  MR  MR  MR  .  Chukotka AO  No  No  No  No  No 
Sakha (Yakutia) republic  MR  MR  .  MR  MR  Irkutsk oblast  No  No  No  No  No 
Kurgan oblast  No  MR  MR  MR  No  Chuvash republic  No  No  No  .  . 
Tomsk oblast  .  .  MR  MR  MR  Evrei autonomous oblast  No  No  No  .  . 
Vologda oblast  .  No  MR  MR  MR  Kalmyk republic  No  No  No  .  . 
Belgorod oblast  MR  No  No  MR  No  Khakasia republic  .  .  No  No  No 
Karelia republic  No  MR  .  No  MR  Mari-El Republic  No  .  No  No  . 
Kemerovo oblast  No  No  MR  .  MR  Primorskii krai  .  No  No  .  No 
Krasnoyarsk krai  No  No  No  MR  MR  Pskov oblast  .  No  No  .  No 
Nizhny Novgorod oblast  MR  MR  No  .  No  Ryazan oblast  .  .  No  No  No 
Samara oblast  MR  .  MR  .  .  Magadan oblast  No  No  .  .  . 
Stavropol krai  .  .  .  MR  MR  Tver oblast  No  No  .  .  . 
Astrakhan oblast  .  .  MR  .  .  St. Petersburg city  No  No  .  .  . 
Krasnodar krai  MR  No  .  .  No  Bryansk oblast  No  .  .  .  No 
Khabarovsk krai  .  .  .  MR  No  Ulyanovsk oblast  No  .  .  .  No 
Murmansk oblast  .  No  No  .  MR  Chita oblast  .  .  .  .  No 
Tyumen oblast  .  MR  No  .  No  Kostroma oblast  .  .  .  .  No 
Volgograd oblast  MR  .  .  .  .  Altai krai  .  .  .  .  No 
Chelyabinsk oblast  R  R  R  R  R  Kaluga oblast  .  .  .  .  No 
Tatarstan republic  R  R  R  R  R  Smolensk oblast  .  .  .  .  No 
Bashkortostan republic  R  R  No  R  No  Sverdlovsk oblast  .  .  .  .  No 
Perm oblast  No  No  R  R  R  Orenburg oblast  .  .  .  .  No 
Kaliningrad oblast  R  R  No  No  R, disperse  Voronezh oblast  .  .  .  .  No 
Mordovia republic  .  .  .  R  R  Vladimir oblast  .  .  No  .  . 
Moskow oblast  No  R  disperse  R  .  Novosibirsk oblast  .  .  No  .  . 
Moscow city  .  .  R  R  MR  Tambov oblast  .  No  .  .  . 
Rostov oblast  .  R  .  R  MR  Tula oblast  No  .  .  .  . 
Adygeya republic  .  R  .  .  .  Udmurtia Republic  No  .  .  .  . 
Kamchatka oblast  No  No  No  No  R  Altai republic  No  .  .  .  . 
Lipetsk oblast  .  .  No  No  R  Dagestan republic  No  .  .  .  . 
Novgorod oblast  No  No  .  R  No  Saratov oblast  No  .  .  .  . 
Arkhangelsk oblast  No  No  No  No  No  Kabardino-Balkar republic  No  .  .  .  . 
Note: “MR”, “R”, “disperse” indicate regions that are captured by multiregional groups, regional groups and firms with no controlling owner respectively; “No” indicates non- 
captured regions;  “.” indicates that there is not enough data about ownership of captors in that region that year; in Kaliningrad oblast in 2000 exactly half of preferential treatments 
were given to regional firms and another half to firms with disperse ownership. 
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Figure A1. Industry distribution of firms in the sample 
Distribution of firms by industries
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